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This paper uses readings of two classic autobiographies, Edmund Gosse’s Father & 
Son and John Stuart Mill’s Autobiography, to develop a distinctive answer to an old 
and central question in value theory: What role is played by pleasure in the most 
successful human life? A first section defends my method. The main body of the paper 
than defines and rejects voluntarist, stoic, and developmental hedonist lessons to be 
taken from central crises in my two subjects’ autobiographies, and argues for a fourth, 
diagnostic lesson: Gosse and Mill perceive their individual good through the medium 
of pleasure. Finally, I offer some speculative moral psychology of human development, 
as involving the waking,  perception, management, and flowering of generic and 
individual capacities, which I suggest underlies Gosse and Mill’s experiences. The 
acceptance of one’s own unchosen nature, discovered by self-perceptive pleasure in the 
operation of one’s nascent capacities, is the beginning of a flourishing adulthood in 
which that nature is fully developed and expressed. 
 
Introduction 
Edmund Gosse was ten before he read a novel, and its effect on him was 
overwhelming: 
 
It is remarkable that among our books, which amounted to many hundreds, I 
had never discovered a single work of fiction until my Father himself revealed 
the existence of Michael Scott’s wild masterpiece. So little did I understand 
what was allowable in the way of literary invention that I began the story 
without a doubt that it was true, and I think it was my Father himself who, in 
answer to an inquiry, explained to me that it was ‘all made up’. He advised me 
to read the descriptions of the sea, and of the mountains of Jamaica, and ‘skip’ 
the pages which gave imaginary adventures and conversations. But I did not 
take his counsel; these latter were the flower of the book to me. I had never 
read, never dreamed of anything like them, and they filled my whole horizon 
with glory and with joy … It was like giving a glass of brandy neat to some one 
who had never been weaned from a milk diet … I must not define too clearly, 
nor endeavour too formally to insist on the blind movements of a childish mind. 
But of this I am quite sure, that the reading and re-reading of Tom Cringle’s Log 
did more than anything else, in this critical eleventh year of my life, to give 
fortitude to my individuality, which was in great danger – I now see – of 
succumbing to the pressure my Father brought to bear upon it from all sides. 
My soul was shut up, like Fatima, in a tower to which no external influences 
could come, and it might really have been starved to death, or have lost the 
power of recovery and rebound, if my captor, by some freak not yet perfectly 
accounted for, had not gratuitously opened a little window in it and added a 
powerful telescope.1 
 
I shall argue that Gosse’s liberating joy, together with a parallel example from the life 
of John Stuart Mill, offers a partial answer to an old and central question in value 
                                                
1 Edmund Gosse, Father & Son ed. Peter Abbs (London: Penguin, 1983 [1907]), pp. 170-2. 
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theory: What role is played by pleasure in the most successful human life—the life 
which goes best for the person whose life it is? 
One familiar answer to that question, offered by psychologists including 
Daniel Kahneman, by politicians and public-policy lobbyists including Richard 
Layard, and by philosophers including Epicurus, Jeremy Bentham, Roger Crisp, and 
Fred Feldman, is hedonism.2 Pleasure’s role is that it is the currency of success: 
pleasure is a character of subjective experience; distinct instances of pleasure are 
fungible; all pleasure and only pleasure is intrinsically good for us. 
That familiar answer meets equally familiar objections: that there is no such 
unitary thing as pleasure to play the role suggested; that different pleasures cannot be 
measured on any common scale, nor therefore compared, summed, or traded; that 
some pleasures—the pleasures of cruelty, for example—are bad for us; that some 
things which are not pleasures—virtue, knowledge, friendship—are good for us. But 
nonetheless, the hedonist seems to be on to something, even if she exaggerates it. 
Pleasure is an important part of human success, not always easily achieved, and a life 
completely lacking in pleasure would not be a good life. 
 
One can bring no greater reproach against a man than to say that he does not set 
sufficient value upon pleasure, and there is no greater sign of a fool than the 
thinking that he can tell at once and easily what it is that pleases him. To know 
this is not easy, and how to extend our knowledge of it is the highest and the 
most neglected of all arts and branches of education. Indeed, if we could solve 
the difficulty of knowing what gives us pleasure, if we could find its springs, its 
inception and earliest modus operandi, we should have discovered the secret of 
life and development, for the same difficulty has attended the development of 
every sense from touch onwards, and no new sense was ever developed without 
pains.3 
 
Hence my question: if pleasure is important, but not because it is the currency of 
success, why and how and when is it important? What part does it play in a human 
life which goes well? 
In this paper I pursue a distinctive account of one of the roles (not the only 
role) of pleasure in human life, which respects the hedonist’s intuition about its 
importance without making it the sole currency of success. I shall argue that pleasure 
is sometimes a medium of self-discovery: what one takes pleasure in can diagnose her 
individual nature, and therefore her individual good. My argument for that account is 
also distinctive, in that I use readings of two classic autobiographies to motivate and 
describe that role for pleasure, and I shall begin by defending that way of proceeding. 
 
                                                
2 Daniel Kahneman, ‘Objective Happiness’ in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, & Norbert 
Shwarz eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1999); Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (London: 
Penguin, 2006); Brad Inwood & L. P. Gerson trans. & ed., The Epicurus Reader: Selected 
Writings & Testemonia (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994); Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to 
the Principles of Morals & Legislation ed. J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970 [1781]); Roger Crisp, Reasons & The Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006): chapter 4; Fred Feldman, Pleasure & the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, 
& Plausibility of Hedonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). 
3 Samuel Butler, ‘On Knowing what Gives us Pleasure’ in John Gross ed., The Oxford Book 
of Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991 [c. 1880]), p. 263. 
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Why Autobiography? 
Why use autobiographies in an attempt at value theory? In the first place, some 
autobiographies are great works of literature, and great works of literature are 
importance resources for understanding human life, as has been argued—and, more 
importantly, demonstrated in practice—by Martha Nussbaum, Bernard Williams, and 
others.4 It is tempting to stop my general justification at that point, and rely on my 
particular results; but I do have four further general reasons for thinking that 
autobiographies are valuable here. 
First, many philosophical accounts of human success are simplistic, in that 
they fail to represent or explain at least the following complexities. Successful life as 
a human being involves many distinct goods. They include some pleasures, but also, 
for instance, aesthetic and emotional experience (even when painful or non-pleasant), 
knowledge, friendship, individuality, self-command, self-expression, health, and the 
development and use of generic human capacities (sexual, perceptual, athletic, 
intellectual…).5 
Further, many of these goods have complex internal structures. Taking one 
example from the partial list of goods just offered, consider self-expression, as 
pursued in the life of a musician. Unlike some pleasures – say the pleasure of 
smoking cigarettes, which is at best one-dimensional – becoming a better and more 
individual musician is a process of deepening or opening out, in which new 
possibilities become available gradually, as some position is achieved from which 
they can – only now – be grasped. The expressive skills of the jazz improviser are 
achieved by rigorous practice on scales, changes, and standards, and by hard 
exploratory work playing with other musicians. John Coltrane’s ability to play within 
a mode and recognizably as himself, for instance on Miles Davis’s Kind of Blue, is 
not immediately available to a starting saxophone player, and its complex character as 
a self-expressive good is shaped by its developmental history. 
As that last point suggests, the many goods also have complex relations of 
dependence and exclusion. Some of the distinctive goods of music are dependent on 
earlier goods: Coltrane’s late, free music on Interstellar Space or Ascension was 
achieved partly through his earlier mastery and gradual transformation of bop, for 
instance on Giant Steps. More, pursuing the good of aesthetic self-expression has 
costs. At the very least, it has opportunity costs: the dedicated musician cannot also 
wholeheartedly pursue the good of family life, amongst other losses. Anthony Storr 
argues that lives can revolve either around the hub of intimate relationships, or of 
solitary creativity, and that either can be highly successful at cost to the other 
possibility.6 There may also be more direct exclusions: the self-shaping demands of 
music are different from those of, for instance, visual art, and developing in one might 
prevent the highest development in the other. 
These complexities are not just momentary, but occur over time in human 
lives structured by biological and other kinds of growth and decline. That is: 
                                                
4 Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy & Literature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990); Bernard Williams, Shame & Necessity (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993). 
5 I intend this as a set of reminders, not as a complete list. One attempt at a comprehensive 
catalogue of goods is William K. Frankena, Ethics (2nd edn, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), 
pp. 87-8. Another is Martha Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities, for instance in 
Women & Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). My reminders draw on both. 
6 Anthony Storr, Solitude (London: Harper Collins 1997). 
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philosophical accounts of human success often fail to reflect the obvious facts that 
humans start as children and then grow up and grow old, and that this process has a 
complex structure over its duration, on which success and failure depend.7 
Putting these complexities together, we might tentatively think of the human 
good as having a tree-like structure through time: a central trunk with branches, 
travelling down any of which excludes travelling down the others, and each part of 
which supports its own further extension. We can then see autobiographies – accounts 
of lives lived, and of causal and other relations between different goods and bads, 
over time – as offering some necessary temporal and developmental complication to 
our thinking. 
My second reason for thinking that autobiographies are useful here is that 
there is a dispute between those accounts of human success which emphasize our 
possession or enactment of particular goods (hedonism, and also for instance the 
broadly Aristotelian tradition in W. D. Ross, John Finnis, Philippa Foot, and others),8 
and those which emphasize our reflexive relations to our possessions and actions (L. 
W. Sumner’s view that the successful life for me is the life with which I am rationally 
satisfied as a whole; Harry Frankfurt’s view that it is the life in which I 
wholeheartedly desire to have my desires).9 My view is that both sides in this dispute 
are importantly half-right; the further question to ask is about the relations and 
tensions between possession and reflexivity. Autobiographies, as – on one hand – 
performances of self-conscious attention to the particular possessions and actions of a 
life, and – on the other – accounts of the discovery and development of those 
possessions and the roots of those actions, in their contexts, offer a rich source of 
material for pursuing that question. 
None of this is to claim that autobiographies are unreflective or theoretically 
innocent: autobiographies – perhaps especially great autobiographies – are obviously 
not value free data. My third reason for thinking autobiographies valuable here is that 
they are themselves a kind of ethical reflection. Specifically, they enact the kind of 
ethical reflection which is the starting-place for classical ethical thought, and which 
involves: first, stepping back from the immediate and quotidian, and taking up a 
separated point of view on my own life. A diary kept at the time is not an 
autobiography, which requires that I as autobiographer take on ‘a double character’ as 
both investigator and object of investigation.10 Second, considering how I have come 
to have my attitudes, projects, and pleasures. Third, judging my life as a whole: to 
what extent and in what parts was it successful, and to what extent and in what parts a 
failure?11 I take this reflective and evaluative character seriously in what follows. My 
                                                
7 Honourable exceptions to this generalization include Michael Slote, Goods & Virtues 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); David L. Norton, Personal Destinies: A Philosophy of 
Ethical Individualism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); J. David Velleman, 
‘Well-Being & Time’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72(1991).   
8 W. David Ross, The Right & The Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930); John 
Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Philippa Foot, 
Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
9 L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, & Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); 
Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) and 
other works. 
10 Roy Pascal, Design & Truth in Autobiography (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 
p. 71. The point about diaries is also Pascal’s. 
11 This characterization of classical ethics draws on Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): chapter 1. 
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aim is not to make use of autobiographical texts as if they were just long and complex 
thought-experiments, but to respect autobiographers as thinkers, and to think with 
them about success and failure. 
My fourth reason for using autobiographies is their particular relevance to the 
aspect of success I’m concerned with in this paper: pleasure. Self-development – the 
partly self-managed achievement of what and who one is – by some combination of 
discovery and creation, is a central focus of autobiography; and – I claim, and will try 
to show in what follows – pleasure has a distinctive role in that development, and 
especially in its development in the face of oppression.  
These reasons, however strong or weak, are additional to my main point: the 
use of autobiographies here is justified, if it is, by what it reveals about the role of 
pleasure in human life. I now begin to pursue that question, by moving on to my 
readings of particular autobiographies. 
 
Mill & Gosse 
John Stuart Mill was almost destroyed by a crisis in which his life lost its point and 
savour, but his joy in love and poetry directed him out of despair. Edmund Gosse was 
recovered to himself out of affectionate oppression by delight at a novel. Mill’s 
description of his crisis is revealing about his own value theory, and especially about 
the extent to which he is really a hedonist.12 But both their experiences, recorded and 
self-analyzed in Mill’s Autobiography and Gosse’s Father & Son, are important for 
the question I am pursuing here. To work towards uncovering what exactly they 
reveal about pleasure in human life, I shall describe the two crises, consider four 
accounts of what we should learn from them, and decide for the fourth. 
John was the son of James Mill: philosophic radical, crusading journalist, East 
India Company official, and friend of Jeremy Bentham. James Mill and Bentham 
were advocates of the ‘greatest happiness principle’ that the purpose and justification 
of human action is to maximize everyone’s pleasure and minimize everyone’s pain, 
and Mill was educated very intensively at home to be best possible advocate for that 
principle and for the radical social change it demanded: he was reading Greek by the 
age of three and writing histories of Rome by six, but he took no holidays, played no 
games, and had no friends his own age. By his twenties, he was an incredibly active 
lobbyist and public intellectual. But then he had a ‘mental crisis’, the trigger for 
which was when he asked himself: 
 
‘Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in 
institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely 
effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?’ 
And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered: ‘No!’ At this my 
heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed 
fell down … I seemed to have nothing left to live for.13 
 
Mill recovered from his crisis, but after his recovery he had different and more 
complex life-goals: he still thought that the purpose and justification of action was 
human well-being; but the things which made his life worth living again – poetry, 
                                                
12 See Samuel Clark, ‘Love, Poetry, & the Good Life: Mill’s Autobiography & Perfectionist 
Ethics’, Inquiry 53(2010). 
13 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography in John M. Robson & Jack Stillinger eds, Collected Works 
of John Stuart Mill vol. 1: Autobiography & Literary Essays (Toronto/London: University of 
Toronto Press/Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 139. 
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especially Wordsworth’s nature poetry, and meeting his eventual wife Harriet Taylor 
– now seemed much more important parts of well-being than they had before.  
Edmund was the son of Philip and Emily Gosse: Philip was a naturalist and 
popular lecturer, ‘the David Attenborough of his day’;14 Emily was a painter, poet and 
writer of evangelical tracts; they were founding members of a primitivist Christian 
group, the Plymouth Brethren. Emily Gosse died slowly and painfully of cancer when 
Edmund was seven, and he was then raised by his father – somewhat similarly to Mill 
– to be a saint, or at least to be saved according to Emily’s strange and now 
unchallengeable lights. Edmund – imaginative, self-conscious, emotionally sensitive – 
eventually found this affectionate and well-meaning oppression impossible to live 
with. An early crux of resistance was when he first read fiction – one of the many 
dogmas of Gosse’s childhood was that telling or reading stories was sinful, and he 
was ten before he read a novel, Michael Scott’s long-forgotten adventure story Tom 
Cringle’s Log.15 I began this paper with his delighted reaction. Gosse slowly and 
painfully escaped from his father’s control: in later life he was a famous poet, literary 
critic and journalist; an early champion of Ibsen, Kipling and Yeats; and a close friend 
of James, Hardy, and Swinburne. As Ann Thwaite draws him, the adult Gosse was a 
brilliant talker, sympathetic and sensuous, charming and funny, needing company, 
needing to be liked, and delighted with literature, gossip, his wife and children, and 
knowing great men; also prone to gloom, touchy, snobbish, apolitically conservative, 
and not quite a great poet despite immense ambition, knowledge, and technical skill.16 
A first and obvious point to take from these two crises, and their place in these 
two lives, is about the importance of choice. According to what I will call 
voluntarism, the successful life is the life of freedom, and freedom is being bound 
only by one’s own choices. So, growth into adulthood is an escape from any demand 
arising from anything but my own will. On this reading, neither Mill nor Gosse 
consented to his upbringing – they were too young to choose it – and each therefore 
rightly rejected it as a tyrannous imposition. But this is inadequate in two ways. First, 
and in general, the fact that someone can be too young to consent suggests that some 
features of the successful life cannot be products of consent. In particular, the vital 
capacity to choose cannot itself be chosen, since it has to be developed out of its lack. 
Second, the voluntarist reading is at odds with Mill and Gosse’s own experiences and 
with what they went on to do. Mill did not give up his position at the East India 
Company to write poetry in the Lake District; he and Harriet did not elope. Gosse was 
as ambitious as his father to explain his work to the reading and listening public. Each 
accepted a great deal of his upbringing, consensual or not, as everyone has to. Neither 
Mill’s crisis and eventual recovery, nor Gosse’s revelatory delight in stories, were 
primarily to do with consent or its absence: they were matters of self-perception and 
the demands of an individual nature. 
It may seem perverse to claim that Mill, who after all wrote that ‘[o]ver 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’,17 was not a 
                                                
14 Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Adam’s Navel’ in The Flamingo’s Smile: Reflections in Natural 
History (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 100. 
15 Available to download from www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7281 (accessed 25 November 
2010).  
16 Ann Thwaite, Edmund Gosse: A Literary Landscape 1849-1928 (London: Martin Secker & 
Warburg, 1984). 
17 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty in John M. Robson ed., Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 
vol. 18: Essays on Politics & Society 1 (Toronto/London: University of Toronto 
Press/Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977 [1859]), p. 224. 
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voluntarist, and Gosse similarly asserts ‘a human being’s privilege to fashion his inner 
life for himself’.18 But it is worth remembering why Mill endorses individual 
sovereignty: because the self-made, self-expressive individual is better off—is a more 
successful human being—than the person crushed and distorted by following 
convention, until ‘by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to 
follow: their human capacities are withered and starved’.19 Similarly, what Gosse 
found wrong with being fashioned by his father rather than by himself was that: 
 
Certain portions of my intellect were growing with unwholesome activity, while 
others were stunted, or had never stirred at all. I was like a plant on which a pot 
has been placed, with the effect that the centre is crushed and arrested, while 
shoots are straggling up to the light on all sides.20 
 
In both cases, voluntarism fails to catch the importance of the expression of nature as 
against its distortion, constraint, or self-abnegation. This is not to claim that choice is 
unimportant or that voluntarism is wholly false, but only that a focus on the 
importance of choice does not catch the insights into human life available from Mill 
and Gosse. 
These considerations might lead us instead, second, to take a stoic lesson from 
my two autobiographical fragments.21 For stoics, flourishing adulthood – the life of 
real freedom and obligation – is the acceptance of necessity. The wise person plays 
the part given to her by providence or chance as best she can, and does not try to 
second-guess its author. Stephen Clark criticizes the voluntarist account of human 
success as the rich adolescent male fantasy of freedom as unlimited power, bound 
only by one’s own choices: as if all obligations were contractual; as if the only 
demands a person needs to feel and be subject to are the demands he himself makes of 
himself; as if he could never discover rather than create obligations.22 Against this 
adolescent fantasy, Clark offers the philosophical pagan argument that successful 
human adulthood has its roots in the demands of nature not in choice. Growth into 
maturity is ‘coming-to-oneself’ in the ‘para-political’ life of friends, family, 
household, craft-association, clan, and so on in widening circles: 
 
It is this network of ‘voluntary associations’ and their corresponding obligations 
– obligations which are not simply what any individual chooses that they should 
be – which continues to provide us all with a sense of who and what we are.23 
 
Freedom and obligation have their roots, not in choice, but in the demands of human 
nature – and especially in humans’ nature as creatures who, unlike many other kinds 
of creature, have both long dependent childhoods and deeply political adulthoods. 
If the stoic is right, then Mill and Gosse’s lives were failures, and the lesson 
we should take from them is a warning. Just as Mill was about fully to take up the 
responsibilities of adulthood in the East India Company and in leadership of the 
                                                
18 Gosse, Father & Son, p. 251. 
19 Mill, On Liberty, p. 265. 
20 Gosse, Father & Son, p. 211. 
21 I use ‘stoic’ only as a handy label; I do not mean to make any ambitious interpretive claims 
about ancient stoicism. 
22 Stephen R. L. Clark, Civil Peace & Sacred Order (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989): chapter 
3. 
23 Clark, Civil Peace, p. 67. 
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philosophic radical movement, he broke and turned to his own private and trivial 
passions. Gosse could and should have become a missionary, as his parents wanted, 
but he wasted his powers in writing gossipy literary columns for the Daily Telegraph 
and pursuing lucrative lecture tours in the United States. Or perhaps, at least in Mill’s 
case, there is a more sympathetic reading available. Perhaps the stoic road to success 
is more complex than I have so far suggested: our local networks are embedded in 
wider circles of responsibility, and sometimes the shift to the next circle out is 
difficult and traumatic. Mill’s crisis, then, was a breakthrough from a too-narrow 
circle into a greater one – it was his first step into his eventual adulthood as an open-
minded reformer speaking to the whole public through his writings, rather than a 
narrow sectarian speaking only to fellow enthusiasts.24 There is some truth in this 
version of the stoic lesson, but it does not catch everything: in particular, it fails to 
explain Mill’s experience either of losing his sense of his life’s meaning or of 
regaining it – it does not explain the developmental role of pleasure, of Mill’s losing 
his old pleasures and gaining new ones, or of Gosse’s overwhelming, revelatory joy at 
storytelling. 
So, perhaps the significance of pleasure should point us in the direction of, 
third, a developmental hedonist lesson, according to which the successful life involves 
a mutually-reinforcing relation between desire and pleasure. On this interpretation of 
Mill’s crisis and Gosse’s revelation, they begin with one set of desires, to be a 
reformer of the world or a bringer of souls to Christ; they get pleasure from satisfying 
them; and, duly rewarded, they continue to desire those things. Then, for whatever 
reason, the connection breaks: Mill can no longer get pleasure from his activism or 
Gosse from his pious witnessing, and so they lose themselves. They have nothing left 
to live for. But then, luckily, they find some other desires and pleasures – love and 
poetry, stories – to sustain them. According to this third lesson, it does not matter 
what our desires are desires for, so long as we have some desires and take pleasure in 
their satisfaction. Desire is an arbitrary means to pleasure. The successful life is the 
life where we want something, get it, and are pleased by it – it could be what moved 
the adult Mill or Gosse, but it could just as meaningfully be fame and fortune, or 
philosophic radicalism, or missionary work, or for that matter collecting stamps. 
Wanting and pleasure in getting are what matter, not what we want. This is 
importantly half-right, at least in emphasizing the role of pleasure; but I also want to 
reject it, in favour of a final lesson. 
The problem with hedonism in this case is that neither Mill nor Gosse 
understood his crux as just a move from one arbitrary set of pleasures to another: each 
experienced it as a liberation and as a self-revelation. Liberation from his father’s 
control and from the education which had shaped him; revelation of deep-rooted 
needs which had been starved by that education. According to this final, diagnostic 
lesson, Mill and Gosse have artificial, alien desires which cannot sustain them. Mill’s 
‘irrepressible self-consciousness’ is a moment of self-perception which reveals not 
only the inadequacy of his current life-plan, but the seeds of a better one in his 
individual nature. Gosse’s pursuit of literature is a matter of vital self-expression; it is 
the delighted release of elements of his nature which had been caged and starved.  
This lesson is related to but distinct from the three possibilities I have rejected. 
In the first place, this is not voluntarism: it is to do with freedom, if to be free is to be 
                                                
24 This is how Richard Reeves reads the crisis in John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand 
(London: Atlantic Books, 2007). 
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self-directed rather than other-directed, but it is not to do with choice. The self which 
directs here imposes itself from inside. It is not chosen; it comes as a shock. 
This is not hedonism: pleasure is important, but its role is not to be the 
currency of success. I am not saying that the goodness of the rebellious expression of 
nature is the pleasure it gives: I am claiming that this particular pleasure is diagnostic, 
not constitutive, of the good, in much the same way that pain is diagnostic of damage, 
fear is diagnostic of danger, or sorrow is diagnostic of loss.25 The pleasure that Mill 
takes in the love and poetry which allow him to escape despair, or that Gosse takes in 
his imaginative engagement with Tom Cringle’s Log, is a perception of their 
goodness, that is a perception of their constitutive role in a flourishing life; pleasure 
therefore identifies goals of resistance and rebellion against their particular, local 
networks of obligation. Mill’s pleasure in Wordsworth’s poetry, for instance, is a 
perception of a demand of his nature, the root of a demand which is unchosen, but 
which can properly stand as Mill’s own against the goals imposed on him by James 
Mill and by Bentham. 
The diagnostic lesson is also not stoic, in that it recognizes the importance of 
resistance. The stoic is right, first, that a flourishing adulthood of freedom and 
obligation depends on the acceptance of nature, not (or not only) on consent; but 
Mill’s nature or Gosse’s nature, which could properly stand against their ordained 
places in the para-political world, revealed themselves through the medium of 
pleasure. The stoic is also right that ‘I did not consent’ is not always the last word 
against some demand – sometimes my choice is irrelevant, or outweighed by some 
other consideration. But lack of consent has historically been, and is still now, an 
important justification of resistance to oppression; and resistance to oppression is not 
something we can do without. Adult political and para-political worlds are often 
corrupt, poisonous, hugely destructive of some or all of the people who are shaped by 
them. Consider the world of slaves and masters: to grow up into a life of slavery and 
slave-holding is to grow up broken. This is obvious in the case of slaves, whose 
central human capacities – for self-command, for forming equal adult relationships, 
for having a say in how their communal lives work – are systematically crushed and 
distorted by enslavement. Orlando Patterson argues that to be a slave is to be an 
outsider to the central para-political networks of human life; to have had one’s ties of 
birth and allegiance deliberately cut; to be socially dead.26 Of course, slaves form 
their own networks against social death – from music-making to surreptitious reading 
to insurrection to revolution.27 It is perhaps less obvious, but I think true, that to grow 
up a slave-holder is also to grow up broken: the master’s central capacities for 
imaginative sympathy and, again, for forming equal adult relationships are crushed 
and distorted. The stoic has an important point, but she is only half right: some forms 
of social life are disastrous, and we need some account of resistance or rebellion 
against our local families, friends, craft-associations, and clans. Slavery is one 
                                                
25 I was prompted to these analogies by Jesse Prinz, Gut Feelings: A Perceptual Theory of 
Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
26 Orlando Patterson, Slavery & Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1982). 
27 For a powerful autobiographical account of individual resistance to enslavement, see 
Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave: Written 
by Himself ed. Houston A. Baker Jr (London: Penguin, 1986 [1845]). For communal 
resistance, see for example C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture & the 
San Domingo Revolution (new edn, London: Alison & Busby, 1980).  
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example of this point, but there are also distorting and destructive forms of friendship 
or of parenthood, as demonstrated by James Mill or Philip Gosse. 
Summing up: voluntarism, stoicism, and hedonism offer variously inadequate 
lessons to take from Mill and Gosse; I claim that their experiences and 
autobiographical self-analyses identify a distinctive pleasure, a revelatory joy, which 
diagnoses their individual human good. 
 
Growing Up 
For all I have said so far, this could just be an idiosyncrasy of Mill and Gosse’s odd 
and extended childhoods, or even just a polemical feature of how they chose to 
represent those childhoods forty years after the fact. That would still be an interesting 
discovery about two individuals’ attempts at self-understanding, but I do want to 
claim wider human significance for the point. I want to say that we have learned 
something important in reply to the question I started with: What is the role of 
pleasure in the best human life? In this final section, I try to make explicit and to 
generalize what we have learned, by offering some speculative moral psychology of 
development which makes sense of Mill’s and Gosse’s experiences. My starting place 
is a point I made in ‘Why Autobiography?’ above, that our account of the good life 
needs to recognize the variety and developmental complexity of human goods. With 
that in mind, I shall sketch one element of human development from childhood to 
adulthood. 
 One significant kind of human good is the class I will call capacities: 
internally-grounded abilities to engage in natively human and individual activities, 
functionings, and achievements.28 Growing up into a flourishing human adult is a 
process involving the gradual waking, development, and eventual flowering of 
various capacities which partially constitute the human good. They include, for 
example, the perceptual and motor capacities that we can see developing in newborns, 
as they gain control over their eye and head movements, learn to pick out faces and 
language-using voices, and so on. They include the aesthetic, emotional, and 
imaginative capacities, and the capacity for self-command, which we hope for in an 
adult, and which are disastrously crushed and distorted by slavery. They also include 
the self-expression of individual drives, powers, and temperaments: Mill’s aesthetic 
and emotional sensibility; Gosse’s literary sensibility. 
The development of capacities is development rather than mere change 
because it has targets it can hit or miss. One basic way in which development can go 
wrong is the failure to flourish of some central capacity, when some generic or 
individual activity, functioning, or achievement is stunted or constrained. But if it is 
not to go wrong, development requires management as well as the absence of stunting 
or constraining factors, and that management is as various as the goods it manages. 
                                                
28 The term ‘functionings’ is meant to recall Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s work on 
capabilities, but their capability is a broader concept than my capacity. To have a capability is 
really to be able to engage in some human functioning, and one can lack capability just 
because one lacks means (one is too poor to buy decent clothes, and therefore cannot appear 
in public without shame) or because of institutional barriers (one is female in a misogynistic 
culture, and therefore cannot earn money to support oneself). Capacities, as I use the term, 
can be necessary conditions for capabilities (to have a voice in government, one must have a 
voice), but they are, specifically, internally-grounded conditions. See further Amartya Sen, 
Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2011). 
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Some capacities are managed by largely non-conscious feedback processes, but others 
can be managed by conscious comparison with an ideal – the aspiring musician with a 
picture of John Coltrane taped inside her saxophone case – or by negotiation with 
others. For Mill and Gosse, there is an important shift from having their development 
(mis)managed by others, to taking it over for themselves. 
 Further, and picking up another point from ‘Why Autobiography?’, about 
reflexivity: we have various and gappy self-perception of our own capacities. We can 
turn our attention on some of them but not others, and some in more detail than 
others, and we use many different media or modes for that perception. For instance, 
we have very little self-perception of our capacity to see the world as a three-
dimensional space – we just make use of it, indeed it just imposes itself on us. Daniel 
Kahneman has argued that many of our moral judgements are made by fast, non-
conscious heuristics whose workings we cannot directly perceive, and whose results 
therefore appear to us as ‘intuitive’.29 Some of our capacities – character-traits, like 
charisma or pomposity – we typically perceive through others’ reported perceptions 
of us: I cannot typically find out that I am pompous except by being told that I come 
across that way. What I have proposed in my account of Mill and Gosse is that our 
pleasures can also be a medium of self-perception: what Gosse is describing in his 
first encounter with fiction is the delight – the glory and joy – of opening new eyes, of 
gaining a new sense; what his pleasure reveals to him is a demanding liberation. 
Gosse’s suddenly woken capacity and Mill’s gradual recovery from despair move 
their lives onto new tracks, against self-alienation and towards freedom. This is a 
motivation for resistance experienced as a peculiar and distinctive pleasure, and the 
medium of self-perception of the woken capacity is that pleasure in its own operation. 
 With that schematic account in place, what I want to say about the diagnostic 
role of pleasure is that Mill’s and Gosse’s developmental cruxes are exemplary 
occasions on which a need for expression of some central individual capacity is 
revealed by pleasure in that capacity’s nascent operation. That is: our pleasures are 
diagnostic of our individual good. Pleasure is a mode of self-perception which 
identifies what is missing or undeveloped in Mill and Gosse’s lives, and points and 
pulls them towards better lives. The general claim I tentatively derive is that the 
acceptance of one’s own unchosen nature, discovered by self-perceptive pleasure in 
the operation of one’s human and individual capacities, is the beginning of a 
flourishing adulthood in which that nature is fully developed and expressed. One can 
manage one’s own development – that is, one can gain freedom understood as self-
direction – by paying attention to and being guided by one’s diagnostic pleasures, and 
one can find in those pleasures a motivation for resistance to parental, educational, 
and other kinds of oppression. Pleasure opens a window through which we can 
glimpse our own possible flourishing.30 
 





                                                
29 See Alex Voorhoeve, Conversations on Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 
chapter 3. 
30 I would like to acknowledge the generosity and patience of audiences in Lancaster, 
Liverpool, London, and York, and especially to thank Derek Edyvane and David Martin for 
valuable discussion. 
